Outputs are of course not the same thing as outcomes, in terms of the impacts that the BGD programme makes. The endeavour needs to be assessed not only in respect of its deliverables, but also with regard to its consequences. And it is most certainly intended that the BGD programme should make a difference to politics and society.
To be sure, the attribution of impacts is notoriously difficult. No argument of causality is susceptible to incontrovertible verification. Moreover, it will be hard to establish the precise contribution of the BGD programme to a given outcome, since activities under this initiative will usually interrelate with multiple various other forces to produce a particular result. Furthermore, many programme effects (including larger consequences on social norms) will probably not be immediately apparent and only emerge in the medium or long term. These inherent methodological limitations having been noted, it remains crucial to strive for a precise assessment of impacts. Careful attention to the issue of outcomes from the start of the programme will not only enhance the quality of future evaluations, but can also help to raise the impacts themselves.
Prospective outcomes can be contemplated in relation to the seven main objectives of the BGD programme set out earlier. Thus it will be assessed how far the BGD programme has succeeded: (a) to push questions of democracy up the agenda of global politics; (b) to increase conceptual clarity in relation to notions of ‘global democracy’; (c) to record, evaluate and increase awareness of innovative efforts to further global democracy; (d) to develop informed and viable prescriptions for forward action on global democracy; (e) to enhance the capacities of practitioners and researchers (particularly in the global south) to investigate and practice global democracy; (f) to further practitioner-researcher exchange; and (g) to deepen networks among those interested to promote global democracy (particularly on north-south and south-south lines).
Various indicators will be tracked to assess advances towards these objectives. Some types of evidence apply to several or all of the goals. These indicators include:
- size and scope of the BGD database
- number and range of visits to the BGD website and its various pages
- distribution of hard-copy publicity regarding the BGD programme
- attendance of BGD events and other presentations of results
- testimonies from participants (conveners, authors, discussants, correspondents)
- commentaries on the BGD programme from other observers
- stimulus to other (academic and practitioner) seminars, workshops, conferences
- input to curricular innovations
- inspiration to further research
- citations of BGD programme publications, policy briefs and paper abstracts
Other impact indicators are more specific to one or the other programme objective. Thus, for example, evidence that BGD activities have heightened concern for global democracy on academic and policy agendas might, in addition to the above, include: explicit mentions of democracy questions in discussions of global public policy; greater and/or more specific attention to global democracy issues in negotiation briefs and conference agendas; and increased levels of publication on the subject of global democracy. Evidence that the BGD programme has clarified concepts of global democracy can also encompass the quality of workshop proceedings and the quality of project publications. As for providing a record of activities to promote global democracy, this outcome might be assessed (on top of the general indicators) in relation to the quantity and quality of case studies produced through the five projects, as well as use of the case studies in academic and policy circles. Evidence of success in generating new ideas to promote global democracy might include: propositions elaborated in project papers; proposals emerging from project workshops; suggestions brought to the programme website; and other proposals developed on the inspiration of BGD work. With respect to capacity development, an additional impact indicator might be the development of democracy promotion measures in policy circles. In regard to practitioner-researcher exchange, the BGD programme might be further assessed in relation to: the quantity and quality of such interactions in project workshops and in presentations of project findings; publications written by researchers for practitioner audiences and vice versa; consultations by practitioners of researchers in the BGD programme; and consultations by researchers of practitioners involved in the BGD programme. Finally, extra evidence of network development might include: depth of collaboration through the convening group; connections forged through project workshops and public seminars; mutual awareness and communications promoted through the database and website; interconnections between BGD groupings and wider networks on shaping globalization.
Impact assessment will be an important ongoing part of the BGD programme. The convening group will meet at regular intervals to review progress towards objectives. These assessments of what has been learned and accomplished may well prompt adjustments to subsequent programme activities. In addition, the programme will issue an annual progress report for public posting on the website, as well as reports for funders. These assessments will draw inter alia on evaluation questionnaires distributed to participants in the various workshops and public presentations, feedback from support staff who have helped organize the events, and comments received on the interactive programme website. Further evaluation will be obtained through peer review of academic publications.
Funding permitting, it would be helpful to conduct a comprehensive external evaluation of the programme 2-3 years after the close of the fifth project. Such an investigation would be useful not only to assess the particular outcomes of the BGD programme, but in addition to reflect on more general lessons about the innovative methodologies explored in the initiative.